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"THROUGH THE WILD CATHEDRAL
EVENING": BARRIERS, ATTITUDES,
PARTICIPATORY DEMOCRACY, PROFESSOR
TENBROEK, AND THE RIGHTS OF PERSONS
WITH MENTAL DISABILITIES
By: Michael L. Perlin*
Michael Stein and Janet Lord's excellent paper on the relationship
between Jacobus tenBroek's vision and jurisprudence and the United
Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (UN
CRD) stands on its own as an important and powerful piece of
scholarship and advocacy, urging a vision of social justice that resonates
for me. There is nothing in it for me to critique, and little for me to add.
I do, though, want to suggest that their paper and Professor tenBroek's
work should both serve to remind us that there is still so much for all of
us to do in this area of law and society.
Professor Stein and his colleague wonderfully contextualize
Professor tenBroek's writings with the UN CRD, and that is a major
accomplishment. But it is one that has led me to think a bit about the
particular significance of Professor tenBroek's work for persons with
mental disabilities, the core of my professional work.
Writing about tenBroek, Professor Mark Weber has pointed out
how tenBroek's writings reflect a "history of people with disabilities as a
gradual progression from compelled separation toward integration,"
noting how "fear of and repugnance to disability thrive when people with
disabilities are locked away,"1 and how our social policies led to a
"legacy of prejudice and exclusion.",2 The UN CRD certainly reinforces
and emphasizes an integration model, and that is a very good thing. But
I remain more than a bit skeptical as to the ultimate "real life" impact of
the UN CRD in many nations, including our own. I will turn to United
States-based Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) as the source of a
parallel.
* Professor of Law, and Director, International Mental Disability Law Reform Project;
Director, Online Mental Disability Law Program, New York Law School.
1. Mark C. Weber, Home and Community-Based Services, Olmstead, and Positive Rights:
A Preliminary Discussion, 39 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 269, 273-74 (2004).
2. Mark C. Weber, Disability and the Law of Welfare: A Post-Integrationist Examination,
200 U. ILL. L. REv. 889, 901 (2000).
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In 1999, in Olmstead v. L.C., the U.S. Supreme Court held that the
ADA entitled the plaintiffs, residents of Georgia Regional Hospital, to
treatment in an integrated community setting as opposed to an
unnecessarily segregated state hospital.3 In writing the majority opinion,
Justice Ginsburg stressed that "[u]njustified isolation ... is properly
regarded as discrimination based on disability,'A and ordered that states
be required to maintain "a comprehensive, effectively working plan for
placing qualified persons with mental disabilities in less restrictive
settings,"5 thus explicitly endorsing the ADA's "integration mandate."6
At least one commentator has characterized this decision as one that
"genuinely awaken[s] the nation's conscience."7
The significance of the "integration mandate" phrase should be
crystal clear. According to Professor John Jacobi, "The opportunity for
'life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness' for Olmstead plaintiffs
depends almost entirely on the integration mandate."8  But in many
jurisdictions, this opportunity has not materialized, and there has been a
cottage industry of litigation over the waiting lists that have developed in
jurisdictions; some states have imposed waits up to seven years. 9
Professor tenBroek and a colleague wrote about this over 40 years ago,
yet, in many ways, little has changed.' °
Professor Stein and Ms. Lord also write eloquently about the
connection between Professor tenBroek's work, the UN Convention, and
"participation in cultural life,"' noting how deprivation of meaningful
opportunity in such areas "can be devastating."'12 This perspective struck
a special chord with me, because I believe that this approach has the
capacity to resuscitate an important, yet now nearly dormant, aspect of
3. 527 U.S. 581, 582 (1999).
4. Id. at 597.
5. Id. at 597, 605-06.
6. I discuss this in Michael L. Perlin, "Their Promises of Paradise ": Will Olmstead v. L.C.
Resuscitate the Constitutional "Least Restrictive Alternative" Principle in Mental Disability Law?,
37 Hous. L. REv. 999, 1003 (2000).
7. Samantha A. DiPolito, Olmstead v. L.C.-Deinstitutionalization and Community
Integration: An Awakening of the Nation 's Conscience?, 58 MERCER L. REV. 1381, 1382 (2007).
8. John V. Jacobi, Federal Power, Segregation, and Mental Disability, 39 Hous. L. REV.
1231, 1247 (2003).
9. Sandra L. Yue, A Return of Institutionalization Despite Olmstead v. L.C.? The
Inadequacy of Medicaid Provider Reimbursement in Minnesota and the Failure to Deliver Home-
and Community-Based Waiver Services, 19 LAW & INEQ. 307, 310 n.20 (2001) (discussing Lewis v.
New Mexico Department of Health, 94 F. Supp. 2d 1217 (D.N.M. 2000) (finding a two- to seven-
year wait for services clearly unreasonable), and Boulet v. Cellucci, 107 F. Supp. 2d 61 (D. Mass.
2000) (holding that a reasonably prompt movement off waiting list for Medicaid waiver services is
within ninety days)).
10. See Paul Steven Miller, Disability, Civil Rights, and a New Paradigm for the Twenty-
First Century: The Expansion of Civil Rights Beyond Race, Gender, and Age, I U. PA. J. LAB. &
EMP. L. 511, 520 n. 44 (1998) (discussing the older "custodial" attitude towards people with
disabilities "typically expressed in policies of segregation and shelter, of special treatment and
separate institutions") (quoting Jacobus tenBroek & Floyd W. Matson, The Disabled and the Law of
Welfare, 54 CAL. L. REV. 809, 816 (1966)).
11. United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, G.A. Res. 61/10
6, at 27, U.N. Doc. A/Res/61/106 (Dec. 13, 2006), Article 30, available at
http://www.un.orglesalsocdev/enablelrights/convtexte.htm (UN CONVENTION).
12. Michael Stein & Janet Lord, Jacobus tenBroek, Participatory Justice, and the UN
Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, 13 TEX. J. C.L. & C.R. 157, 182 (2008).
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the rights of persons in psychiatric institutions. I characterize these
rights as "other institutional rights."' 3 Let me explain.
The history of expansion of the substantive civil rights of persons
institutionalized because of mental disability generally follows two
paths: the development of the right to treatment 4 and the development of
the right to refuse treatment.' 5 But this cursory approach obscures the
rights of such persons to exercise civil rights while institutionalized, an
area of civil rights that is now, less than thirty-five years after its first
articulation, nearly forgotten. This category bundles rights that we think
about occasionally (e.g., the right to vote;' 6 the right to sexual
interaction) 7 with those that we rarely consider (e.g., the right to
exercise;' 8 the right to freely practice religion;' 9 the right to be paid for
institutional work;2 ° the right to free speech).2' I have written about all
of these topics in a mental disability law treatise.22 By way of example,
the section of the supplement to that treatise that deals with "other
institutional rights" topics takes up only seven pages; 23 the section that
deals with the right to refuse treatment encompasses twenty-three
pages,24 and the section that deals with sex offender laws spreads out to
forty-three pages.25  Clearly, these are areas of the law that appear to
have fallen by the advocate's wayside.
But, as Professor Stein and Ms. Lord underscore, the UN
Convention speaks to an important array of participatory civil rights.
They do us a favor by highlighting these rights, and by stressing their
value and worth. But I want to take this one step further. Perhaps this
focus will serve to invigorate this area of patients' rights in domestic law
and revive it from its current dormancy. In the parallel area of
correctional law, domestic courts have not hesitated to cite to
international standards in cases involving, for instance, the "double
13. See generally, MICHAEL L. PERLIN, Other Institutional Rights in MENTAL DISABILITY
LAW: CIVIL AND CRIMINAL, Ch. 3C (2d ed. 1999); Michael L. Perlin et al., Therapeutic
Jurisprudence and the Civil Rights of Institutionalized Mentally Disabled Persons: Hopeless
Oxymoron or Path to Redemption?, I PSYCHOL., PUB. POL'Y & L. 80, 97 (1995).
14. See PERLIN, supra note 13, Ch. 3A, §§ 3A-2 to 3A-5.5.
15. See id. atCh. 3B.
16. See, e.g., Developments in the Law-The Law of Mental Illness VII: Voting Rights and
the Mentally Incapacitated, 121 HARV. L. REV. 1179 (2008).
17. See, e.g., Michael L. Perlin, "Limited in Sex, They Dare": Atitudes Toward Issues of
Patient Sexuality, 26 AMER. J. FORENS. PSYCHIATRY 25 (2005); Michael L. Perlin, Hospitalized
Patients and the Right to Sexual Interaction: Beyond the Last Frontier? 20 NYU REV. L. & SOC'L
CHANGE 517 (1993-94).
18. See, e.g., PERLIN, supra note 13, § 3C-6.5.
19. Seeid.at§3C-3.1.
20. See id. at § 3C-37.1i; see also, e.g., Michael L. Perlin, The Right to Participate in
Voluntary, Therapeutic, Compensated Work Programs as Part of the Right to Treatment: A New
Theory in the Aftermath ofSouder, 7 SETON HALL L. REV. 298 (1976).
21. Seeid, e.g.,at § 3C-3.3.
22. See PERLIN, supra note 13.
23. See MICHAEL L. PERLIN & HEATHER ELLIS CUCOLO, MENTAL DISABILITY LAW: CIVIL
AND CRIMINAL, 2006-07 Cumulative Supplement (2007), at 39-46 (all supplemental listings to
Chapter 3C).
24. Id. at 16-39 (all supplemental listings to Chapter 3B).
25. See PERLIN & CUCOLO, MENTAL DISABILITY LAW: CIVIL AND CRIMINAL, supra note
23, at 14-57 (all supplemental listings to § 2A-3.3).
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bunking" of inmates.26 It is my hope that Professor Stein and Ms. Lord's
paper will lead to a similar focus in domestic mental disability law
institutionalization cases.
These comments of mine, however, go simply to "the law." We
must go beyond the law and focus also on the issues of attitudes. In
another article, Professor Stein cites the political scientist Harlan Hahn
who has asserted that able-bodied society feels "existential anxiety"
towards persons with disabilities.27 That "anxiety" is at the core of my
writing about sanism and pretextuality. I will explain these briefly and
then seek to demonstrate how these concepts are so intertwined with
Professor tenBroek's scholarship and advocacy.2 8
Sanism is an irrational prejudice of the same quality and character
of other irrational prejudices that cause (and are reflected in) prevailing
social attitudes of racism, sexism, homophobia, and ethnic bigotry. It
infects both our jurisprudence and our lawyering practices. 29 Sanism is
largely invisible and largely socially acceptable. It is based
predominantly upon stereotype, myth, superstition, and de-
individualization, and is sustained and perpetuated by our use of alleged
ordinary common sense (OCS)30  and heuristic reasoning in an
unconscious response to events both in everyday life and in the legal
31process.
Pretextuality can explain the ways in which courts accept (either
26. See generally Lareau v. Manson, 507 F. Supp. 1177, 1187-89 n.9 (D. Conn. 1980); see
generally, MICHAEL L. PERLIN & HENRY A. DLUGACZ, MENTAL HEALTH ISSUES IN JAILS AND
PRISONS: CASES AND MATERIALS 1026-49 (2008).
27. Michael Ashley Stein, Disability, Employment Policy, and the Supreme Court, 55
STAN. L. REV. 607, 631- 32 (2002) ("Harlan Hahn... asserts that able-bodied society feels
'existential anxiety' towards the disabled." (quoting political scientist Harlan Hahn, Toward a
Politics of Disability: Definitions, Disciplines, and Policies, 22 SOC. Sl. J. 87 (1995))); Harlan
Hahn, Civil Rights for Disabled Americans, in IMAGES OF THE DISABLED, DISABLING IMAGES 181,
182 (Alan Gartner & Tom Joe eds. 1987).
28. It is with this in mind that I chose my title. It comes from Bob Dylan's masterpiece,
Chimes of Freedom (1964) and is found in this verse, a verse that I believe resonates for the
purposes of this symposium:
Through the wild cathedral evening the rain unraveled tales / For the disrobed
faceless forms of no position / Tolling for the tongues with no place to bring their
thoughts / All down in taken-for-granted situations / Tolling for the deaf an' blind,
tolling for the mute / Tolling for the mistreated, mateless mother, the mistitled
prostitute / For the misdemeanor outlaw, chased an' cheated by pursuit / An' we
gazed upon the chimes of freedom flashing.
BOB DYLAN, CHIMES OF FREEDOM, on ANOTHER SIDE OF BOB DYLAN (Columbia Records 1964).
29. See generally, MICHAEL L. PERLIN, THE HIDDEN PREJUDICE: MENTAL DISABILITY ON
TRIAL 21- 59 (2000); Michael L. Perlin, On Sanism, 46 SMU L. REV. 373 (1992).
30. OCS is a "powerful unconscious animator of legal decision making," Michael L.
Perlin, She Breaks Just Like a Little Girl: Neonaticide, The Insanity Defense, and the Irrelevance of
Ordinary Common Sense, 10 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 1, 25 (2003) (OCS is a "powerful
unconscious animator of legal decision making."); see Richard K. Sherwin, Dialects and
Dominance: A Study of Rhetorical Fields in the Law of Confessions, 136 U. PA. L. REV. 729, 737
(1988) (OCS exemplified by the attitude of "What 1 know is 'self evident'; it is 'what everybody
knows."').
31. Perlin, She Breaks Just Like a Little Girl, supra note 30, at 24-25, citing Michael L.
Perlin, Half-Wracked Prejudice Leaped Forth: Sanism, Pretextuality, and Why and How Mental
Disability Lav Developed As It Did, 10 J. CONTEMP. LEG. ISSUES 3,4-5 (1999).
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implicitly or explicitly) testimonial dishonesty and engage similarly in
dishonest and frequently meretricious decisionmaking. Specifically, this
is the case where witnesses, especially expert witnesses, show a high
propensity to purposely distort their testimony in order to achieve desired
outcomes. This pretextuality is poisonous. It infects all participants in
the judicial system, breeds cynicism and disrespect for the law, demeans
participants, and reinforces shoddy lawyering, blas6 judging, and, at
times, perjurious and/or corrupt testifying.32
How are these concepts related to the topic of today's program?
Writing about Professor tenBroek's scholarship, Andrew Weis has noted,
"Although persons with disabilities possess mental and/or physical
impairments, society's physical obstacles and attitudinal barriers more
often ultimately handicap or impede their pursuit and enjoyment of daily
activities., 33 Recently, I have turned my attention to these concepts in
the context of the relationship between international human rights and
mental disability law.34 In an article that is currently in press, Professor
Eva Szeli and I look at the recent work of Professor Tara Melish on this
topic and then consider sanism in the specific context of the Convention
about which Professor Stein writes so eloquently:
In arguing why the United States should ratify the new UN
Convention, Tara Melish focused on the "deeply entrenched
attitudes and stereotypes about disability that have rendered
many of the most flagrant abuses of the rights of persons with
disabilities 'invisible' from the mainstream human rights
lens."35  These stereotypes are the essence of sanism;
vigorous, advocacy-focused counsel is needed to answer and
rebut them.
36
Here, Professor tenBroek's thoughtful voice demanding
participatory justice for persons with disabilities37-an eloquence
matched by Professor Stein's, both in this paper and elsewhere 38 _
resonates for us. One of the hallmarks of the process that led to the
publication of the UN Convention was the participation of persons with
32. Perlin, She Breaks Just Like a Little Girl, supra note 30, at 25.
33. Andrew Weis, Peremptory Challenges: The Last Barrier to Jury Service for People
with Disabilities, 33 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 1, 29, n. 122 (1997) (emphasis added).
34. See, e.g., Michael L. Perlin, International Human Rights Law and Comparative Mental
Disability Law: The Universal Factors, 34 SYRACUSE J. INT'L L. & COMMERCE 333, 333 (2007);
Michael L. Perlin, International Human Rights and Comparative Mental Disability Law: The Role of
Institutional Psychiatry in the Suppression of Political Dissent, 39 ISRAEL L. REV. 69, 89-92 (2006);
MICHAEL L. PERLIN ET AL., INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS AND COMPARATIVE MENTAL
DISABILITY LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 283-319 (2006).
35. See generally, Tara Melish, The UN Disability Convention: Historic Process, Strong
Prospects, and Why the U.S. Should Ratify, 14 HUM. RTS. BRIEF 37,44 (Winter 2007).
36. Michael L. Perlin & Eva Szeli, Mental Health Law and Human Rights: Evolution and
Contemporary Challenges, in MENTAL HEALTH AND HUMAN RIGHTS (forthcoming Michael Dudley
ed. 2008).
37. See, e.g., Jacobus tenBroek, The Right to Live in the World: The Disabled in the Law of
Torts, 54 CAL. L. REV. 841, 842 (1966).
38. See, e.g., Michael Ashley Stein, Disability Human Rights, 95 CAL. L. REV. 75 (2007).
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disabilities and their clarion cry, "[N]othing about us, without us." 39
This has led commentators to conclude that the Convention "is regarded
as having finally empowered the 'world's largest minority' to claim their
rights, and to participate in international and national affairs on an equal
basis with others who have achieved specific treaty recognition and
protection. 'A4
But to what extent can we count on the UN Convention to change
the underlying attitudes about which Professor tenBroek wrote so lucidly
decades ago? I wish I were more confident. The new UN convention
mandates that "States Parties shall take appropriate measures to provide
access by persons with disabilities to the support they may require in
exercising their legal capacity. '41  Elsewhere, the Convention
commands:
States Parties shall ensure effective access to justice for
persons with disabilities on an equal basis with others,
including through the provision of procedural and age-
appropriate accommodations, in order to facilitate their
effective role as direct and indirect participants, including as
witnesses, in all legal proceedings, including at investigative
and other preliminary stages.42
The extent to which this Article is honored by signatory nations
will have a major impact on the extent to which this entire Convention
39. See, e.g., Rosemary Kayess & Phillip French, Out of Darkness into Light? Introducing
the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, 8 HUM. RTS. L. REv. 1, 4 n. 15 (2008):
See, for example, Statement by Hon Ruth Dyson, Minister for Disability Issues, New
Zealand Mission to the UN, for Formal Ceremony at the Signing of the Convention
on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, 30 March 2007: 'Just as the Convention
itself is the product of a remarkable partnership between governments and civil
society, effective implementation will require a continuation of that partnership.'
The negotiating slogan 'Nothing about us without us' was adopted by the
International Disability Caucus, available at
http://www.un.org/esa/socdev/enable/documents/StatConv/nzam.doc [last accessed
13 November 2007].
For a thoughtful discussion of the "unrelenting advocacy" of disability rights group in the
Convention-drafting process, see Amita Dhanda, Constructing a New Human Rights Lexicon:
Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, 5 INT'L J. HUM. RTs. 43, 55 (2008).
40. Kayess & French, supra note 39, at n. 17 ("See, for example, statements made by the
High Commissioner for Human Rights, Louise Arbour, and the Permanent Representative of New
Zealand and Chair of the Ad-Hoc Committee on a Comprehensive and Integral International
Convention on the Protection and Promotion of the Rights and Dignity of Persons with Disabilities,
Ambassador Don Mackay, at a Special Event on the Convention on Rights of Persons with
Disabilities, convened by the UN Human Rights Council, 26 March 2007, available at
http://www.unog.ch/80256EDD006B9C2E/
(httpNewsByYear en)/7444B2E219117CE8CI2572AA004C5701?OpenDocument [last accessed 13
November 2007].").
41. UN CONVENTION, supra note 11, at art. 12.3. See generally, Stein, supra note 38. For
a thoughtful and comprehensive predecessor article, see generally Aaron A. Dhir, Human Rights
Treaty Drafting Through the Lens of Mental Disability: The Proposed International Convention on
Protection and Promotion of the Rights and Dignity of Persons with Disabilities, 41 STAN. J. INT'L
L. 181 (2005).
42. UN Convention, supra note 11, at art. 13.1.
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matters" to persons with mental disabilities. It is still a very open
question as to whether or not these rights will actually be given life, or
whether they will remain little more than "paper victories.
'
"
4
Writing in 1993, Eric Rosenthal and Leonard Rubenstein first
illuminated how the MI Principles "come from an individualistic,
libertarian perspective that emphasizes restrictions on what the state can
do to a person with mental illness. ' '45 A presenter at a conference held at
New York Law School on the treatment of persons with mental
disabilities referred to this article and then told the audience, "Without
advocates willing to get in the trenches and fight for these ideals, so that
they might become a reality for persons with mental disabilities, these
treaties and standards remain mere words without action. 46 This is a
goal to which all of us who take this area of law and society seriously
should aspire.47
43. See generally, Michael L. Perlin, "I Might Need a Good Lawyer, Could Be Your
Funeral, My Trial ": Global Clinical Legal Education and the Right to Counsel in Civil Commitment
Cases, 28 WASH. U. J. L. AND POL'Y, (forthcoming 2008). An important, still-unanswered question
is this: to what extent will the Convention be a "human rights convention for the 21st century," see
Lisa Waddington, A New Era in Human Rights Protection in the European Community: The
Implications [of] the United Nations' Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities for the
European Community, manuscript at 4, available at http:ssm.comabstractl1027872 (accessed
January 26, 2008), or a "moral compass for change," Gerard Quinn, The UN Convention on the
Human Rights of Persons with Disabilities, at 3, available at http://www.nhri.net/2007/Berlin-
Quinn.2.pdf, as distinguished commentators have predicted.
44. Michael L. Perlin, "'What's Good is Bad, What's Bad is Good, You'll Find out When
You Reach the Top You're on the Bottom ": Are the Americans with Disabilities Act (and Olmstead
v. L.C.) Anything More Than "Idiot Wind?," 35 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 235, 246 (2002) ("Mental
disability law is strewn with examples of 'paper victories .... ') (quoting Michael Lottman, Paper
Victories and Hard Realities, in PAPER VICTORIES AND HARD REALITIES: THE IMPLEMENTATION OF
THE LEGAL AND CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF THE MENTALLY DISABLED 93 (Valerie J. Bradley &
Gary J. Clarke eds., 1976)).
45. Eric Rosenthal & Leonard S. Rubenstein, Inernational Human Rights Advocacy Under
the "Principles for the Protection of Persons with Mental Illness ", 16 INT'L J.L. & PSYCHIATRY
257, 260 (1993). In 1991, the UN General Assembly adopted the Principles for the Protection of
Persons with Mental Illness and for the Improvement of Mental Health Care (widely referred to as
the 'MI Principles'). G.A. Res. 119, U.N. GAOR, 46th Sess., Supp. No. 49, Annex at 189, U.N.
Doc. A/46/49 (1991). Until the ratification of the UN Convention, they were seen as "the most
comprehensive international human rights standards for persons with mental disabilities" that had
ever been promulgated. See Perlin & Szeli, supra note 36, manuscript at 3.
46. Symposium, International Human Rights Law and the Institutional Treatment of
Persons with Mental Disabilities: The Case of Hungary, 21 N.Y.L. SCH. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 361,
381 (2002) (remarks of Jean Bliss).
47. See Perlin, Universal Factors, supra note 34, at 357.
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